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Abstract. – The works devoted to the study of Spanish arbitrismo, developed between 
the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, have been traditionally influ-
enced by a negative perspective, inherited from the use given to the adjective arbi-
trista in the past, when it was used almost as an insult. Instead of emphasising this 
negative view, it would perhaps be convenient to analyse such as what they really 
were, at least to a certain extent; that is, collective opinions seeking to influence 
the king and his most trusted circle. While Castilian arbitrismo of financial nature 
has been more widely studied, the arbitrismo developed in the colonial world is 
less known, especially that for the possessions in Atlantic Africa. These texts were 
written by merchants, soldiers, and clerics with great experience in the service of 
these territories. As a crucial “remedy” to solve the problems of these difficult times 
of monarchical “decline”, these texts propound an encouragement of territorial 
conquest and defensive fortresses, as well as a reorganisation of the main resour-
ces and of trade that would enable them to put an end to fraud and abuse.
“the arbitristas as a group remain too little known.”
John H. Elliott (1977)
Introduction
It was traditional in the context of European royalty that all vassals had a 
right to be heard by their lord. The lord, in turn, was obliged to choose that
* To Carlos Martínez Shaw, mentor and friend, because he taught me how to “think 
historically”. This contribution has been made possible by the projects: RYC-2011-08053, 
HAR 2011-25907, HAR 2012-37560-C02-01. I am very grateful for the comments made on 
a first draft of this work by Carlos Martínez Shaw, José María Iñurritegui Rodríguez, Sir 
John H. Elliott, Antonio-Miguel Bernal, Pedro Cardim, and Manuel Herrero Sánchez. I am 
also indebted to the very useful feedback given by the anonymous reviewers of this journal. 
Any mistakes or omissions are entirely my own
WBD_412-22366_JBLA_51.indb   113 15.10.14   11:58
114 José Antonio Martínez Torres
piece of advice which best suited him from those presented. There was even 
the possibility – why not? – that he could reject all of them, which was not 
at all unusual.1 It seems obvious that this premise was followed throughout 
the Spanish Baroque. How else could we explain the prowling around the 
surroundings of the Queen’s Yard at the Alcazar of Madrid – seat to the 
main councils of the Monarchy – of notorious groups of different geograph-
ical origins composed of impoverished merchants, captains hardened a 
thousand battles, clerics, lawyers, and bachelors? They all decided to pay a 
visit to the Court in Madrid – heart of what was known as economía de la 
gracia2 – to enquire some influential person within the complex but effi-
cient royal bureaucratic machinery about the state of a particular processed 
file or dossier. These documents, often written in haste to obtain a gift or 
privilege, would pile up on the sturdy wooden tables in the offices of the 
councils’ secretaries. Expert and punctilious readers appointed by those in 
charge of the main collegiate organisms of imperial Spain would pass 
judgement over which texts were to be admitted and which were not. If the 
author had friends and relatives there were many possibilities that his docu-
ment would be studied and assessed in a consulta ordinaria. Moreover, if 
he had savings, he could circulate it as a manuscrito que corre and stir 
debate in the context of the great development that – just like in so many 
other European cities of the time – the printing press was experiencing in 
Madrid. Experts point out that, only between 1605 and 1615, 12,000 copies 
of Don Quixote reached the European market. Approximately half of them 
were printed in the almost 100 printing houses functioning in the Court at 
that time.3
Concerning these works of recommendation, and in contrast with 
Miguel de Cervantes’s brilliant work, it is possible to spot vacuous rhetoric 
in some of them, but some others present detailed “remedies” to solve the 
different evils that afflicted the Monarchy’s ailing body politic. The Castil-
ian word used to describe many of these discourses is arbitrio, synonymous 
1 Otto Brunner, Land und Herrschaft: Grundfragen der territorialen Verfassungsge-
schichte Österreichs im Mittelalter (Darmstadt 1973), p. 426–437.
2 Marcel Mauss, Ensayo sobre el don. Forma y función del intercambio en las socieda-
des arcaicas (Buenos Aires 2009); Maurice Godelier, Antropología y economía (Barcelona 
1976); Bartolomé Clavero, Antidora: Antropología Católica de la Economía Moderna 
(Milan 1991); Antonio Manuel Hespanha, La Gracia del Derecho: Economía de la Cultura 
en la Edad Moderna (Madrid 1993). 
3 Fernando Bouza, Corre manuscrito: una historia cultural del Siglo de Oro (Madrid 
2001); idem, ‘Dásele licencia y privilegio’. Don Quijote y la aprobación de libros en el Siglo 
de Oro (Madrid 2012); Roger Chartier, “La Europa castellana durante el tiempo del Quijote”: 
Antonio Feros/Juan Eloy Gelabert (eds.), España en tiempos del Quijote (Madrid 2005), 
p. 162–198; Francisco Rico, Tiempos del ‘Quijote’ (Barcelona 2012). 
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to the Portuguese word alvitre, and probably almost equivalent to the Eng-
lish project and the French avis; all of which flourished during this period as 
the inspiring source of certain policies. Of course, the writers of these works 
were known as arbitristas in Spanish, alvitristas in Portuguese, and projec-
tors and donneurs d’avis in England and France respectively.4 What is even 
more, nowadays it is no secret that empires like Turkey or China – studied 
and admired by renowned European political treatise writers of the late six-
teenth and early seventeenth centuries – also profited from the services pro-
vided by these projectors, who had often been trained in the bowels of gov-
ernmental power. Among the various subjects reflected upon and analysed 
by this legion of writers coming from all sorts of geographical regions we 
can find the optimal rationalisation of public funds, commerce, and poli-
orcetica. They also put forward other more audacious or even curious opin-
ions on morality and on the customs of those who were prone to stepping the 
line of what was considered appropriate at the time. All sorts of things could 
be a matter of study for these quill and ink professionals, and it is not diffi-
cult to imagine them locked up in a basement or garret surrounded by enor-
mous books bound in goatskin, writing and reading relentlessly.
Doubtless, some of this is true in the case of Anthony Sherley, an Eng-
lish adventurer serving under the Spanish Monarchy who had been 
employed thanks to his vast knowledge – fundamentally acquired in Asia 
and America – on strategic and commercial affairs. We know that he spared 
no effort in sending arbitrio after arbitrio on such relevant subjects to the 
State, War, and Portugal Councils at the end of Philip III’s time and during 
Philip IV’s reign. The missions that he undertook for the Monarchy in some 
of the most distant and vulnerable parts of the Spanish Empire earned him 
the ferocious enmity of some royal councillors, who openly accused him of 
being a mere “charlatán e invencionero”. Curiously enough, however, they 
also made him worthy of the trust of the all-powerful Count-Duke of Oli-
vares, for whom Sherley was a “hombre de mucha experiencia y que [había] 
visto mucho”. Claiming to know the “sustancia de gobierno” of the enemies 
of the Habsburgs – as Anthony Sherley himself stated in some of the works 
4 The existing bibliography on arbitrismo is copious. See especially Diogo Ramada 
Curto, O discurso político em Portugal, 1600–1650 (Lisbon 1988); Agustín Redondo 
(coord.), Le corps comme métaphore dans l’Espagne des XVI et XVII siècles (Paris 1992); 
Louis Baeck, The Mediterranean Tradition in Economic Thought (London 1994); Anne 
Dubet, “L’arbitrisme: un concept d’historien?”: Cahiers du Centre de Recherches Histori-
ques 24 (2000), p. 141–167; Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, “Por una ‘economía política’”: 
idem, La crisis de la Monarquía (Madrid 2009), p. 242–275; and Arndt Brendecke, Imperio 
e información. Funciones del saber colonial español (Madrid/Frankfurt am Main 2012), 
which is indispensable.
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he wrote from his retreat in Granada – could be labelled as pretentious, but 
it most certainly contributes to explain why, in 1616, the Spanish Crown 
decided to grant him an annual allowance of 3,000 escudos under the 
express condition that he would not conspire for other governments.5
The ambiguous nature of some of these men who were close to the 
effective government was probably consubstantial to the tricks of engaño 
and disimulo which characterised politics during the European Baroque 
period. This nature has never received much attention in the historiography, 
and it is definitely worthwhile to delve into cases such as those of Sherley 
or João Salgado de Araújo.6 We already knew that the latter had been, from 
the beginning of the seventeenth century, a Portuguese arbitrista renowned 
for his knowledge in political and commercial matters and who enjoyed the 
support and sympathies of relevant personalities of the time who were 
opposed to royal power, such as don Miguel de Noronha or Mendo da Mota. 
These connections would result in Salgado de Araújo being exiled from the 
Court of Madrid in 1639, just one year before the Portuguese rebelled 
against the “tiranía de Castilla”. What we did not know, however, was his 
audacity when it came to describing his own profession as pertaining to 
“prophetas falsos”. There were no doubts about this for the author of Marte 
Portugués (1642). At this stage of the period of the union, the arbitristas 
were “gente foragida del Reyno”, capable of deceiving even the “ministros 
[más] ambiciosos”.7
A pejorative and, to a certain extent, disdainful perspective has heavily 
weighed up on the studies dedicated to arbitrismo. This view has been 
5 Archivo General de Simancas (hereinafter AGS), Estado, legajo 436, f. 132; John H. 
Elliott, El Conde-Duque de Olivares. El político en una época de decadencia (Barcelona 
1991), p. 157, 159, and 169, here: p. 157. 
6 José Antonio Maravall, Estudios de historia del pensamiento español. Siglo XVII 
(Madrid 1975); José Antonio Fernández-Santamaría, Razón de Estado y Política en el Pensa-
miento Español del Barroco, 1595–1640 (Madrid 1986); Rosario Villari, Elogio della dissi-
mulazione. La lotta política nel Seicento (Bari 1987), p. 3–48; Xavier Gil Pujol, “Las fuerzas 
del rey. La generación que leyó a Botero”: Mario Rizzo/José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez/Gaetano 
Sabatini (eds.), Le forze del Príncipe. Recursos, instrumentos y límites en la práctica del 
poder soberano en los territorios de la Monarquía hispánica (Murcia 2003), vol. II, p. 969–
1022; Mauricio Viroli, De la política a la razón de Estado. La adquisición y transformación 
del lenguaje politico (1250–1600) (Madrid 2009), p. 289–298 and 309–312; Romain Descen-
dre, L’État du Monde. Giovanni Botero entre raison d´État et géopolitique (Genève 2009); 
Quentin Skinner, Uma Genealogia do Estado Moderno (Lisbon 2011).
7 Marte portugués contra emulaciones castellanas o justificaciones de las armas del 
Rey de Portugal contra Castilla (Lisbon 1642), p. 199 and 213, quoted by Miguel Geraldes 
Rodrigues, Do Reino a Angola. Agentes, arbítrios e negócios na rede familiar de João Sal-
gado de Araújo (unpublished BA thesis, Universidade Nova de Lisboa 2013). I am indebted 
to the author for providing me with a copy of it. 
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inherited from the past, in which the words arbitrio and arbitrista were 
used as weapons to discredit the projects produced before a group of experts 
by a person who was considered a political adversary. Rather than dwelling 
on this negativity, which would inevitably draw us to conclude that the texts 
of the arbitristas were impractical and not very useful in many cases, it 
would be helpful to analyse these documents as what they are, to a certain 
extent: collective opinions with a certain ability to influence the king and 
his most trusted circle thanks to the control of essential power mechanisms. 
These men flourished significantly under the Crown of Spain during the 
rule of the so-called “minor Habsburgs” – a time when, as is well-known, it 
was united to the Crown of Portugal and its overseas possessions for a sig-
nificant period of more than half a century.
This may explain why Philip IV issued a decree in October 1622 urging 
his ministers for the West Indies “que no se le embaraze con consultas 
inútiles”.8 This precept was to remain unfulfilled for, not long after the royal 
will had been so expressed, such opinions emerged again, although this 
time the themes to be analysed and the remedies that should be applied to 
them were drastically opposite to those that had been originally considered. 
Whereas in the early seventeenth century some of the territories in America 
were seen as a last resort for the Monarchy, at the end of the seventeenth 
century the American settlements had become – as the Low Countries had 
been before them – a dispensable and heavy burden to be continuously car-
ried by the sore royal shoulders. The old, but useful work by Manuel Col-
meiro, published in 1861 and re-edited in 1947, is the point of departure for 
any research project focusing on this subject.9 A total of 165 arbitrios have 
been recorded for the reigns of Philip III and Philip IV alone. These arbi-
trios are, as John H. Elliott has rightly pointed out, the “survivors”, but it is 
possible that we may be able to find many more in the specific juntas com-
missioned by the main Councils of the Monarchy during this period.10 The 
form of arbitrismo more widely studied is the financial one, and it often 
originated in Castile, the kingdom which suffered the most from the fund-
ing of Spain’s incommensurate imperial enterprise across the “cuatro partes 
del mundo”.
Thanks to essential research on these subjects carried out between the 
seventies and the early nineties of the past century, it would not be absurd to 
 8 British Library, Eggerton, 1.322, f. 9. 
9 Manuel Colmeiro, Biblioteca de los economistas españoles de los siglos XVI, XVII y 
XVIII (Barcelona 1947). 
10 John H. Elliott, “Introspección colectiva y decadencia en España a principios del 
siglo XVII”: idem, España y su Mundo, 1500–1700 (Madrid 2007), p. 299–322, here: p. 301. 
The first edition of this crucial article dates back to 1977. 
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state that all historians, whether specialised or not, are nowadays familiar 
with the language and chronology of this process of “collective introspec-
tion” headed by authors as essential to the mercantilist heritage of Europe 
as Sancho de Moncada or Duarte Gomes Solis. However, we do not know 
so well which kind of arbitrismo was developing in the overseas territories 
at the time when these men were writing their works. The same can be said 
about some alimentary treatises which served them as argumentative weap-
ons.11 These texts can be identified in rough outlines as having a similar 
origin and intention, and having been elaborated by soldiers, merchants, 
and clerics highly experienced in the government, ways, and services of the 
imperial periphery. In many cases they proposed, as an essential “remedy” 
to overcome these difficult years of monarchical “decline”, to promote the 
conquest and defence – at sea and inland – of the scattered and badly articu-
lated colonial possessions; to put an end to bad administration; and to reor-
ganise again resources and trading schemes (of medium and large reach). 
This was intended to furnish the Crown with a greater specific weight, in 
line with what the enemies of Spain and Portugal had been doing for some 
time through the establishment of their trading companies for the East and 
West Indies.12
The aforementioned work by Colmeiro along with a series of essential 
studies such as those by Professors John H. Elliott and Pierre and Jean 
Vilar13 constitute a key list of readings for any researcher willing to explore 
the arbitrista thought and its era. However, I would not like to avoid the 
commitment that the advantageous position of these pages offers me to 
11 Fred Bronner, “Peruvian arbitristas under Viceroy Chinchón, 1629–1639”: Scripta 
Hierosolymitana 26 (1974), p. 38–78; idem, “Tramitación legislativa bajo Olivares. La 
redacción de los arbitrios de 1631”: Revista de Indias XLI, 165–166 (1981), p. 411–441; 
John H. Elliott, “América y el problema de la decadencia española”: idem, España en 
Europa. Estudios de historia comparada (Valencia 2002), p. 217–236; Diogo Ramada Curto, 
Cultura imperial e projetos coloniais (séculos XV a XVIII) (São Paulo 2009), p. 7–17 and 
145–355; Arrigo Amadori, Negociando la obediencia. Gestión y reforma de los virreinatos 
americanos en tiempos del conde-duque de Olivares (1621–1643) (Sevilla 2013), p. 117–141 
and 304–376, and the bibliography found there. 
12 AGS, Estado, legajo 2.847. Mendo da Mota’s report “sobre la necesidad de fomentar 
el comercio español” (March 6th, 1623). 
13 John H. Elliott, España y su Mundo, 1500–1700 (Madrid 2007); idem, España, 
Europa y el Mundo de Ultramar, 1500–1800 (Madrid 2010); Pierre Vilar, “Los primitivos 
españoles del pensamiento económico. ‘Cuantitativismo’ y ‘bullonismo’”: Crecimiento y 
desarrollo (Barcelona 1976), p. 135–162; idem, “El tiempo del ‘Quijote’”: ibidem, p. 332–
346; Jean Vilar, Literatura y economía. La figura satírica del arbitrista en el Siglo de Oro 
(Madrid 1973); and Luis Perdices de Blas, La economía política de la decadencia de Castilla 
en el siglo XVII (Madrid 1996). Pierre Vilar’s works were published in 1956 and 1962 res-
pectively. 
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commend the reading of forgotten documentary compendia on the so-called 
“conquest” of Angola carried out by the Portuguese between the late six-
teenth and the early seventeenth centuries.14 Indeed, these texts narrate the 
hazardous penetration into the Western part of the African continent, its 
exploitation, its defence, and the expenses generated as well as news on 
religious missions (mostly Jesuit) and on the syncretic and yet barely known 
rites and customs practised in the area. In short, they are essential works to 
understand and comprehend, by means of the different perspectives pro-
vided by the people who wrote about such topics, the Iberian presence in 
this neglected part of the Spanish Habsburgs’ Empire during this particular 
period of the union of the crowns.15
Iberian Africa
Portuguese expansion in the African continent – and the rest of the known 
world – commenced on August 22nd, 1415, when a carefully set up Portu-
guese amphibious expedition took the Moroccan stronghold of Ceuta with 
little resistance of its native population. For the Portuguese Crown there 
were three essential purposes concerning the North of Africa: to control the 
geographically strategic area of the Strait of Gibraltar, to counteract the 
activities of the feared Barbary pirates, and to obtain a significant advan-
tage over the Crown of Castile, which also pursued its own interests in the 
area. It would not be thus exaggerated to state that, until well into the fif-
teenth century, the city of Ceuta became a relevant “magnet” for European 
merchants because it received large quantities of black slaves, gold dust or 
tibar, refined salt, spices (especially cinnamon and malagueta or “pimienta 
pobre o falsa”), carpets, ivory, perfumes, and dyes brought by camel trains 
that crossed the Sahara and Middle East deserts.16
14 Luciano Cordeiro, Questões Histórico-Coloniais, 3 vols. (Lisbon 1935), vol. I (for 
the years 1574–1631); António Brásio, Monumenta Missionaria Africana. África Occidental 
(Lisbon 1954–1956), vols. IV, V, VI, and VII (for the years 1469–1630); Louis Jadin, 
L’Ancien Congo et l’Angola, 1639–1655, d’après les archives romaines, portugaises, néer-
landaises et espagnoles, 3 vols. (Brussels/Rome 1975); Beatrix Heintze, Fontes para a his-
tória de Angola do século XVII, 2 vols. (Stuttgart 1985). 
15 David Birmingham, Portugal and Africa (New York 1999); John K. Thornton, A Cul-
tural History of The Atlantic World, 1250–1820 (New York 2012); Mariana P. Candido, An 
African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World: Benguela and its Hinterland (Cambridge 2013). 
16 Vitorino Magalhães Godinho, Os descobrimentos e a economia mundial, 4 vols. (Lis-
bon 1991), vol. I, p. 139–143, and vol. II, p. 174–177 and 245–267; John K. Thornton, “Os 
portugueses em África”: Francisco Bethencourt/Diogo Ramada Curto (eds.), A expansão 
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Without denying or pushing into the background the commercial incen-
tive that the Ceutan enterprise meant for Portuguese expansion around the 
most important seas and oceans of the globe, the truth is that this conquest, 
as well as that of the contours of the African continent, had been strongly 
spurred on by the minor nobility, which had been, for some time now, in 
open conflict with their homonyms of higher social rank. The extraction of 
glory and titles for their offspring had been at the origins of this very sig-
nificant African campaign. The legitimising façade of the enterprise was 
not devoid of certain logic: a long-standing tradition of battling the Muslim 
enemy. As is well known, from the mid-fourteenth century, the kings of 
Portugal, Castile, and Aragon had considered themselves the “legítimos 
herdeiros” of the ancient Visigothic Northern Africa which had been 
usurped from their ancestors by the huestes mouras commanded by Tariq 
ibn Ziyad in 711.
It is actually under this context that the three monarchs of the Iberian 
Peninsula decided to forge a tacit agreement allowing each other to inter-
vene and exert their influence in those parts of Africa which were nearest to 
their kingdoms. The specific case of Portuguese influence in North-eastern 
Morocco’s affairs had its origins in the relentless struggle against Islam 
since the crucial battle of Río Salado (1340). A set of five papal bulls – 
issued successively between 1341 and 1377 – officially authorised the mon-
archs to organise crusades against the Muslims in Granada and Northern 
Africa. It is true that the same ecclesiastical documents were never put into 
practice because the plague and the wars in Castile prevented that from hap-
pening. However, they turned out to be a precedent for future kings – espe-
cially João I, Manuel I, and Sebastian I – who, in times of welfare and rela-
tive calm, would resume their forefathers’ ambitions to attain an imperio 
universal parallel, although with notable differences, to that which was 
being gestated during the same period in Castilian territories thanks to the 
theoretical abilities of prelates such as Rodrigo Jiménez de Rada and 
Alfonso de Santa María. Ceuta, like all other relevant strongholds that were 
later conquered in the Maghreb – Alcazarquivir, Arzila, Azemur, Mazagan, 
Safi, and Tangier – inevitably opened the possibility of a new collective 
goal thanks to a careful ideological scheme intertwined with worldly and 
secular powers.17
marítima portuguesa, 1400–1800 (Lisbon 2010), p. 145–168; Anthony R. Disney, História 
de Portugal e do Império portugês, 2 vols. (Lisbon 2011), vol. II, p. 43–64.
17 John H. Elliott, “España y su imperio en los siglos XVI y XVII”: idem, España y su 
Mundo, 1500–1700 (Madrid 2007), p. 27–50; Luis Felipe F. R. Thomaz, De Ceuta a Timor 
(Lisbon 1994), p. 47–50; Franz Bosbach, Monarchia Universalis. Storia di un concetto car-
dine della política europea (secoli XVI–XVIII) (Milan 1998); Pablo Fernández Albaladejo, 
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Since the abovementioned conquest of Ceuta and right up until the sec-
ond half of the sixteenth century, most North African cabilas signed excep-
tional and precise peace treaties with the Portuguese conquerors. Trade, 
which requires the “trust” of different agents to be able to develop vigor-
ously, was established almost without any problems in the whole of this 
African strip. There were of course attempts to expand beyond Ceuta and 
the neighbouring strongholds that had been conquered in subsequent years. 
However, all these attempts failed because the political power that Portu-
guese soldiers clashed with was much more organised than they had been 
initially believed to be. The absence in North African strongholds of rich 
resources similar to those that would be extracted later from Madeira, Cape 
Verde, Angola, Brazil, and the rest of the scattered strings of factories that 
composed the Estado da Índia also contributes to explain to a certain extent 
why the enterprise of Morocco was neglected. Not until the reign of Sebas-
tian I would this old aspiration of expanding towards the African inland 
from the North be resumed when war was declared on the Moroccan sultan 
that had deposed Muley Ahmed, who had been favourable to the Portu-
guese. The outcome could not have been more adverse to the whole of the 
Portuguese population: most of the members of the expedition that had 
accompanied the young king were either lost or captured, and the kingdom 
became fertile ground for prophecies and legends announcing the return of 
a monarch who had survived the plains of Alcazarquivir.18
“‘Imperio de por sí’: La reformulación del poder universal en la temprana edad moderna”: 
Fragmentos de Monarquía. Trabajos de Historia Política (Madrid 1992), p. 168–184; idem, 
“Imperio e identidad: consideraciones historiográficas sobre el momento imperial español”: 
Semata 23 (2011), p. 11–18; David Armitage (ed.), Theories of Empire, 1450–1800 (London 
1998), p. xv–xxxiii; Anthony Pagden, Señores de todo el Mundo. Ideologías del Imperio en 
España, Inglaterra y Francia en los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII (Barcelona 1997), p. 45–136; 
Serge Gruzinski, Les quatre parties du Monde. Histoire d´une mondialisation (Paris 2004), 
p. 24–33; Pedro Cardim, “La aspiración imperial de la monarquía portuguesa (siglos XVI y 
XVII)”: Gaetano Sabatini (ed.), Comprendere le monarchie iberiche. Risorse materiali e rap-
presentazioni del potere (Rome 2010), p. 37–72; Giuseppe Marcocci, A consciencia de um 
imperio. Portugal e o seu mundo (sécs. XV–XVII) (Coimbra 2012); Eva Botella Ordinas, 
“‘Exempt from time and from its fatal change’: Spanish imperial ideology, 1450–1700”: 
Renaissance Studies 26, 4 (2012), p. 580–604, here: p. 580–595; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, 
Impérios em Concorrência. Histórias conectadas nos séculos XVI e XVII (Lisbon 2012), 
p. 113–152; and Peer Schmidt, La monarquía universal española y América. La imagen del 
Imperio español en la Guerra de los Treinta Años (1618–1648) (Mexico City 2012), p. 344–
356.
18 Lucette Valensi, Fables de la mémoire. La glorieuse bataille des trois rois (Paris 
1992); Jacqueline Hermann, No Reino do Desejado. A Construçao do Sebastianismo em Por-
tugal (Séculos XVI e XVII) (São Paulo 1998); Ruth Mackay, The Baker Who Pretended to be 
King of Portugal (Chicago 2012). 
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Not even the incorporation of the Crown of Portugal into the combina-
tion of territories that were part of the Spanish Monarchy could stimulate 
the development of these strongholds. The latter were – with the exception 
of Ceuta and Tangier for obvious geo-strategic reasons – largely lacking in 
resources and much damaged by Riffian raids. The desertion of Portuguese 
soldiers in Mazagan to the ranks of their Muslim enemies was both notori-
ous and continuous even before the period of the union of the crowns. The 
neglect suffered by Portuguese prisoners was somewhat alleviated by Span-
ish redeemers belonging to the Trinitarian and Mercy Orders who, during 
the period of the union of the crowns, managed to free an average of two 
people per year through royal support.19
Portuguese expansion along the coast of Africa may possibly be due to 
the failure of the conquest of Morocco. Be it as it may, the truth is that the 
contacts established by the Portuguese in the Western coasts of Africa were 
of a different flavour to those that had been established in the Northern ter-
ritories some years before. The first exchanges with the peoples of the Afri-
can coasts had taken place on board, which favoured the prompt fortifica-
tion and planting of the islands. In 1441 the port of Lagos received for the 
first time a rich and exotic cargo coming from the African coasts, which 
included twelve black slaves, gold, ivory, refined salt, and ostrich eggs. 
Between that date and well into the seventeenth century, when Portuguese 
merchants were replaced in the slave market by the Dutch, voyages to the 
coasts of Guinea would be organised in a disorganised but routine manner.
The regularisation of all these deals was the most important purpose of 
Don Henrique’s rule. He replaced the razzias of the first period of the con-
quest by what was known as resgate or barter system. The Island of Arguin 
became thus the first Portuguese feitoria in 1445. A few years later, in 1488, 
peace embassies were sent by the sovereigns of Portugal and the most 
important authorities in the area. During these initial contacts, wheat, 
horses, and cloth bought in Northern Europe and Morocco were exchanged 
for gold, ivory and, above all, slaves captured in the vast region comprised 
between the Gambia and Niger Rivers. The establishment of a permanent 
commercial centre in this area of modern Mauritania and, soon afterwards – 
19 António Dias Farinha, História de Mazagão durante o período filipino (Lisbon 
1970); Beatriz Alonso Acero, Orán-Mazalquivir, 1589–1639: Una sociedad española en la 
frontera de Berbería (Madrid 2000), p. 421–438; José Antonio Martínez Torres, Prisioneros 
de los infieles. Vida y rescate de los cautivos cristianos en el Mediterráneo musulmán (siglos 
XVI–XVII) (Barcelona 2004), p. 137; José Antonio Martínez Torres/Antonio José Rodríguez 
Hernández, “Una lealtad esquiva. Ceuta antes y después de su agregación a la Monarquía 
hispánica”: Carlos Martínez Shaw/José Antonio Martínez Torres (dirs.), España y Portugal 
en el Mundo, 1581–1668 (Madrid 2014). 
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in 1482 –, in São Jorge da Mina would define the basic outlines of the colo-
nisation pattern, mainly based in the security provided by these well-fortified 
strongholds. In 1502, for example, a fortress was erected in Axim (in the Gulf 
of Guinea), and two more were built respectively in 1505 and 1507 in Sofala 
and Mozambique, in Eastern Africa. Lagos, first, and Lisbon, a bit later, would 
become the receiving and distributing centres of a growing and important 
trade regulated through the Casa da Guiné e Mina. Until the creation of the 
Casa da Índia in 1504, all Portuguese overseas trade was supervised by this 
institution. Even the famous Casa dos Escravos, which controlled the 
entrance of black prisoners into Lisbon, depended on the Casa da Guiné e 
Mina.20 The German cosmographer Hieronymus Münzer, who travelled 
through the Iberian Peninsula at the end of the fifteenth century, did not 
hesitate to note down in his journal that Lisbon was the European capital 
for trade in black slaves and exotic merchandise. Between the second half 
of the sixteenth and the early seventeenth century, African slaves formed 
10% of the population in Lisbon. Such a percentage could only be found in 
other Southern European cities such as Seville.21
From the second half of the sixteenth century, the Western African 
coast – from the Cape Verde Islands to the kingdom of Congo – were 
divided by the Portuguese into two great commercial areas that were then 
rented by the Crown to a prominent merchant or rendeiro for a maximum 
period of four or six years. The two trading poles that we are pointing out 
here were the area of Cape Verde, to the North of the coastline, and the area 
of São Tomé, to the South. The jurisdiction of both territories was quite 
large, as it extended from the Benin Empire, up North, to what would later 
be Angola, down South. The vast majority of the men, women, and children 
captured in this region of Central Africa by the slave traders or lançados 
were sent to São Tomé, which was then the most buoyant area, but which, 
in contrast with promising Angola, was forced to pay customs duties to the 
20 Malyn Newitt, “Prince Henry and the Origins of Portuguese Expansion”: Malyn 
Newitt (ed.), The First Portuguese Colonial Empire (Exeter 1986), p. 9–35; Thornton, “Os 
portugueses em África” (note 16); Disney, História de Portugal (note 16), vol. II, p. 79–156.
21 Alessandro Stella, Histoires d´esclaves dans la Péninsule ibérique (Paris 2000), 
p. 74–79; Luis Felipe de Alencastro, O Trato dos Viventes. Formação do Brasil no Atlântico 
sul (São Paulo 2000), p. 77–116; Antonio de Almeida Mendes, “Les réseaux de la traite ibé-
rique dans l’Atlantique nord. Aux origines de la traite atlantique (1440–1640)”: Annales. 
Histoire, Sciences Sociales 4 (2008), p. 739–768; Bernard Vincent, “La esclavitud en el 
Mediterráneo occidental (siglos XVI–XVIII)”: José Antonio Martínez Torres (dir.), Circula-
ción de personas e intercambios comerciales en el Mediterráneo y en el Atlántico (Madrid 
2008), p. 39–64; José Antonio Martínez Torres, “L’esclavage en Méditerranée et dans 
l’Atlantique Nord (1571–1700)”: Fabienne P. Guillén Salah Trabelsi (eds.), Les esclavages 
en Méditerranée. Espaces et dynamiques économiques (Madrid 2012), p. 141–150.
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highest ruler of Congo, who was known as Manicongo. In a way, São Tomé 
Island became some sort of warehouse for slave workforce that supplied 
three different kinds of markets: local markets such as that of São Jorge da 
Mina, the markets of Southern Europe with Lisbon as the most important 
city distributing this kind of trade, and later on, at the end of the same cen-
tury, the American markets of Brazil, the Caribbean, and Mexico.22
Between the late fifteenth and mid-sixteenth centuries, the port of Mina 
was the most important slave buyer, with a total of 30,000 per year. These 
figures should be, of course, linked to the introduction of sugarcane cultiva-
tion in Madeira and São Tomé. In the case of the former, the introduction of 
Genoese capital, the effective work techniques imported from Sicily, and 
the slave workforce made Madeira a rich producer thanks to its eighty 
engenhos and an annual production of 120,000 arrobas of sugar up until the 
mid-sixteenth century. Its decline overlapped to a certain extent with the 
rise – until the late sixteenth century – of São Tomé, which doubled such 
production. The gigantic possibilities of this “sacarocracy” can be seen in 
the case of Brazil, where during the first quarter of the seventeenth century 
there were already 235 engenhos and an annual harvest of 1,100,000 arro-
bas of sugar.23 The shift in terms of economic exploitation from the Eastern 
possessions to those of the Mid-Atlantic was already an established fact in 
Portugal in the early seventeenth century.
The horizon of possibilities offered by the coasts of Western Africa 
launched the movement of a large number of Portuguese merchants, sol-
diers, and clerics to the fertile lands of Congo. Portuguese influence on the 
main local ruler, the Manicongo, was of such magnitude that the latter’s 
closest advisers were merchants from Lisbon. The Catholic Church even 
found in Congo a warmer welcome than it had received among other popu-
lations of the Atlantic African coastline, because from 1521 it could count 
among its ranks with a black prelate. The ambiguous stance taken by the 
Portuguese soldiers in relation to the border battles that took place from 
1560 between the Manicongos and their Angolan enemies, the N’golas, 
finally prompted the Manicongo Álvaro I to transfer to them vast lands 
between the Dande and Cuanza rivers in an attempt to get rid of them. 
22 Enriqueta Vila Vilar, “Extranjeros en Cartagena (1593–1630)”: Jahrbuch für Geschi-
chte Lateinamerikas 16 (1979), p. 147–184; Nicolás Ngou-Mvé, El África bantú en la colo-
nización de México (1595–1640) (Madrid 1994); Alencastro, O Trato (note 21), p. 43 and 69, 
where these figures are offered based on research by Philip D. Curtin and David Eltis. 
23 Tony Hodges/Malyn Newitt, São Tomé and Príncipe: From Plantation Colony to 
Microstate (London 1988); Godinho, Os descobrimentos (note 16), vol. III, p. 102–113; 
Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550–
1835 (Cambridge 1985), p. 16–19.
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These lands presented a great potential in terms of exchanges between the 
Portuguese merchants, but they were also dangerous, as they were inhabited 
by tribes such as the Jagas, poorly organised but very hostile, and the Sobas, 
with a better social structure but less belligerent.
The Portuguese pondered over the relationship between profits and 
costs, and soon enough they decided to plant, quite regularly since 1571, 
the lands that had been named that very same year as Angola (they had been 
previously known as “Lower Guinea”). Despite this, it became necessary to 
explore and exploit a territory that was deemed as dense and insalubrious 
by means of a conquering expedition. The leader of the expedition was 
Paulo Dias de Novais, a grandson of the explorer Bartolomeu Dias, who 
had been a prisoner in Congo between 1560 and 1565 as a result of his 
attempt to establish contact with Manicongo Bernardo I’s greatest rival, the 
N’gola Kiluanji Kiassamba. When he returned to Lisbon in 1571 – he was 
freed on the promise that he would bring military aid to defeat his enemy – 
Sebastian I granted him the corresponding carta de donación and the title of 
“governador e capitao-mor, conquistador e povoador” of Angola, making 
the most of the rivalry between the Manicongo and the N’gola. This impor-
tant enterprise – which sailed from Lisbon on October 23rd, 1574, and 
landed in the Ilha das Cabras (modern Luanda) on February 11th, 1575 – 
was composed of seven ships, a bit less than a thousand soldiers, and some 
clerics, basically Jesuits and Franciscans.24 The main aim of the expedition 
was obvious: to control the promising slave market in the area. Luanda, 
strongly fortified in 1576, would be the headquarters of such trade. The 
policy followed in this area – which would be almost the same for the rest 
of the overseas territories – was based on favouring the divisions between 
the rival African tribes, something that was achieved by the establishment 
of asymmetric relations. They would provide the natives with trinkets, bad 
quality wine, and defective pistols and muskets in exchange for slaves, 
ivory, gold, and silver.
The results of Dias de Novais’s expedition were very notable: they pen-
etrated onto the continent more or less sixty leagues from the coastline, and 
they founded important fortresses such as Massangano in 1583. The figures 
that we know for casualties are sufficient evidence to prove that the battles 
were extremely fierce. Between 1575 and 1594, for instance, we know that 
24 David Birmingham, Trade and Conquest in Angola (London 1965); Robin Law, The 
Slave Coast of West Africa, 1550–1750. The Impact of the Atlantic Slave Trade on an African 
Society (Oxford 1991), p. 118 ff.; Alencastro, O Trato (note 21), p. 188–210; Thornton, “Os 
portugueses em África” (note 16), p. 157–166; Ilídio do Amaral, O Consulado de Paulo Dias 
de Novais. Angola no Último Quartel do Século XVI e Primeiro do Século XVII (Lisbon 
2000). 
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a total of 3,480 Portuguese disembarked, of which 3,180 died; that is, 
almost 92%. Such numbers prove that, just like in Europe, the “permanent 
state of war” was also constant in the African continent – so much so that 
some of the figures available show an average of two conflicts per year 
between 1603 and 1642.25
Despite the aforementioned “estado de guerra permanente”, the profit-
ability of the Angolan settlement was guaranteed. Between 1575 and 1587, 
an average of 4,000 slaves were shipped every year, a figure that would be 
doubled after Angola was granted a rental agreement separate from that of 
São Tomé, which took place in that very same year of 1587.26 The mer-
chants and soldiers that made a living out of the war business and the slave 
trade in São Tomé and Angola entered a competition for the lucrative black 
slave market. It could not have been otherwise. All the supporters of Ango-
la’s agreement denounced the deceptive ways of and the abuses committed 
by the dealers of São Tomé, who according to the former dwelled in the 
Angolan lands to carry out their business, just like before the agreement. 
Those from São Tomé were obviously indifferent towards this criticism, 
which made relations between the two colonies extremely tense during the 
period of the union of the crowns and during the fight against Spain for 
their independence. The conquest of this part of Africa, likened to that car-
ried out years before by the Extremaduran Francisco Pizarro in Peru, 
included the plan to reach the kingdom of Monomotapa sailing up the 
mighty Cuanza and Cuama rivers – the latter being the name of the Zam-
bezi river back then – to seize the legendary gold mines from times of the 
no less mythical king Solomon. Once this had been achieved, this supra-
territory would be governed by a viceroy of the royal blood who would 
maintain close relations with Brazil.27
Besides these considerations, the most interesting fact to be retained is 
that the conquerors and merchants were demanding attention due to the 
forced halt suffered by the enterprise of Angola after the death of Paulo 
25 Beatrix Heintze, “Luso-african feudalism in Angola? The vassal treaties of the 16th to 
the 18th century”: Revista Portuguesa de Historia XVIII (1980), p. 111–131; John K. Thorn-
ton, “The Art of War in Angola, 1575–1680”: Comparative Studies in Society and History 30, 
2 (1988), p. 360–378; Ngou-Mvé, El África bantú (note 22), p. 58; Adriano Parreira, The 
Kingdom of Angola and Iberian Interference, 1483–1643 (Uppsala 1985), p. 99–100; idem, 
Economia e sociedade em Angola na época da Rainha Jinga, Século XVII (Lisbon 1997), 
p. 24–28. 
26 Godinho, Os descobrimentos (note 16), vol. IV, p. 161–181, here: p. 165; Alencastro, 
O Trato (note 21), p. 44–76; Disney, História de Portugal (note 16), vol. II, p. 125–156.
27 Archivo Histórico Ultramarino, Mozambique, caja 1, documento 10; Godinho, Os 
descobrimentos (note 16), vol. I, p. 183–209.
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Dias de Novais in 1589, Philip II’s disastrous venture in England, and the 
political and religious setbacks in France and the United Provinces. It was 
thus necessary to resume the conquest of 1575 and expand it beyond the 
sixty miles that had been already achieved. There would also be a second 
stage during which the area would be continuously evangelised and colo-
nised with the building of churches and the cultivation and assignment of 
resources and defences. This was the only possible way to keep this vast 
territory, which was only limited by the coastline if they were to resist the 
main enemies of the Spanish Monarchy: the Dutch. The latter, strategically 
settled in the Congolese port of Pinda and the isle of Saint Helena (an 
important fresh water spot for those ships sailing to the East Indies, Brazil 
or the Río de la Plata region), would disturb as much as they could the com-
mercial monopoly of the Catholics thanks to an important smuggling trade 
that was practised in many cases with the connivance of the corrupt Iberian 
authorities of the area. It is within this peculiar context that we should 
understand and comprehend some of the representative texts produced in 
this part of Africa between the rule of Paulo Dias de Novais (1575–1589) 
and that of Fernando de Sousa (1624–1630).
Colonial Discourse
A few years before, after Governor Paulo Dias de Novais had died – in 1589, 
as has already been noted – a series of texts were written which denounced 
certain frauds and administrative neglects that had taken place in some parts 
of Angola due to the standstill that its conquest went through after the set-
backs of the Spanish Monarchy in Europe.28 In these texts, basically the 
works of experienced soldiers, merchants, and clerics who had closely fol-
lowed the political management of Dias de Novais, the latter was exalted 
and there was an almost unanimous approval of territorial expansion and the 
subjugation of the Sobas, which was achieved through military force after 
fierce battles. At a later date and with a marked tax collection purpose in 
mind, the Sobas were grouped and classified according to a series of areas 
ruled by their main chiefs – a system reminiscent of the Middle Ages.29
To a certain extent, the misgovernment described for this forgotten cor-
ner of the overseas empire of the Spanish Habsburgs was not exaggerated 
by the informants. When Governor João Rodrigues Contino arrived in 
28 See mainly Cordeiro, Questões (note 14), vol. I, p. 167–380; Brásio, Monumenta 
Missionaria Africana (note 14), vols. IV, V, VI, and VI.
29 Heintze, “Luso-african feudalism” (note 25); Thornton, “The Art of War” (note 25).
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Angola to replace João Furtado de Mendoza in 1601, none of the Sobas 
which had fought against Dias de Novais’s troops acknowledged the “new” 
authority figure of the Iberian government. It was described in such manner 
in a relación written after Rodrigues Contino’s death on September 28th, 
1603, in which we can also read that before the governor’s death, only “se 
sujetaron cinco [Sobas]” out of the 150 that usually acknowledged the suze-
rainty and dominion of the Catholic king. The person finally appointed by 
the Council of Portugal and the viceroy to replace Rodrigues Contino for 
the difficult task of administering justice in Angola during these crucial 
years was Manuel Cerveira Pereira. He chose to pursue the same policy of 
conquest and colonisation followed by Dias de Novais and Contino, and he 
stated that, to that end, he was ready to use a significant part of his troops, 
which were then registered as comprising a total of 570 Portuguese, some 
companies of “negros amigos” – the exact figures are not given in the docu-
ment – and some thirty horsemen.30
The breakup of the coexistence established in Angola by Governor 
Paulo Dias de Novais with royal assent between the conquerors and the 
conquered can be corroborated by the objective fact that in less than eleven 
years, those between 1589 and 1600, five different governors were required 
to keep the newly acquired territories of Philip II in relative calm. This is 
also made patent in a series of important memoriales, alvitrios, and informes 
about “el reino de Angola y la isla de Luanda” addressed to the Spanish 
Crown and the Council of Portugal in 1588, 1592 and 1599, and written by 
Diego de Herrera, Domingo de Abreu e Brito, and Jerónimo Castaño, 
respectively.31 The works by Herrera and Castaño present an additional 
interest because in them they recreated their experiences on the coasts of 
Western Africa as soldiers and merchants serving under the direct orders of 
Dias de Novais and because they never hide their firm and categorical pur-
pose to go beyond the territorial expansion that had taken place during the 
30 British Library, Additional, 20.786, f. 325.
31 Biblioteca Nacional de España (hereinafter BNE), Manuscritos, 5.785 “Memorial de 
Diego de Herrera sobre la conquista del Reino de Angola”, fs. 193–197; BNE, Manuscritos, 
3.015: “Memorial de Jerónimo Castaño sobre la conveniencia de comerciar en el Reino de 
Angola y conquistarle”, fs. 169–174 and 202–205; Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal (here-
inafter BNP), Reservados, códice 294: “Sumario e descripçao do reino de Angola, e do des-
cobrimento da ilha de Loanda e da grãdeza das capitanías do estado do Brasil, hecho por 
Domingo de Abreu e Brito”, 84 folios. For a faithful reproduction of this document, see 
Alfredo de Alburquerque Felner (ed.), Um inquérito à vida administrativa e económica de 
Angola e do Brasil (Coimbra 1931). As far as I know, the first to point out the relevance of 
these documents were Jaime Cortesão, História da espansão portuguesa. Obras completas 
(Lisbon 1993, 1st ed. 1931–1934), vol. IV, p. 74–76; and Claudio Miralles de Imperial y 
Gómez, Angola en tiempos de Felipe II y de Felipe III (Madrid 1951). 
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above mentioned exploratory expedition of 1575. The work by Abreu e 
Brito is also imbued with this interventionist esprit propounded by Herrera 
and Castaño as the most urgent and efficient remedy to redress the total lax-
ity in political and administrative functions experienced in this area of the 
African continent. It also provided figures and evidence which are of ines-
timable value to clarify some of the most recurring frauds that had taken 
place in the slave trade during the first years of the enterprise’s economic 
take-off.
Repeating here the polemic on the origins of Diego de Herrera’s and 
Jerónimo Castaño’s origins would add nothing to the debate, since until we 
find reliable sources on the places where they were baptised and where they 
died, such a debate will only be based on conjectures which may distract us 
from what was a common situation at the time; that is, that under the Span-
ish Monarchy there were Portuguese men serving in Castilian territories 
and vice versa.32 Diego de Herrera was just one of many soldiers who 
obeyed and carried out orders for both crowns. His works clarify this with-
out any doubts, as he confesses having served the army for a total period of 
twenty-two years: “catorce en Brasil y otras partes de África” and another 
eight in the viceroyalty of Peru in the company commanded by captains 
Pedro Meléndez and Diego Flores de Valdés.33
The “obligación de administración de doctrina conforme al Perú” was 
essential and decisive for the development of the African enterprise sketched 
out by Herrera. The more than 500 fijosdalgos that would be – according to 
him – needed “para conquistar y poblar” the whole of Angola would not 
entail any extra cost to the royal treasury because “no haber mene ster llevar 
mantenimientos andando e conquistado porque en aquella tierra hay mucho”, 
and because they would provide revenues and pensions – in terms of repar-
timiento – for more than 30,000 ducats.34 Diego de Herrera, as businessman 
and interested party that he was, did not forget to ask from Philip II the issu-
ing of the appropriate licencia and carta de encomienda to leave the Court 
of Madrid and go to Lisbon, where one of his ships was already “totalmente 
aparejada” to come to the aid of the “desabastecida y estropeada” garrison in 
32 Domingo Centenero Arce, “Soldados portugueses en la Monarquía católica, soldados 
castellanos en la India lusa”: Pedro Cardim/Leonor Freire Costa/Mafalda Soares da Cunha 
(orgs.), Portugal na Monarquia Hipânica. Dinâmica de integração e conflito (Lisbon 2013), 
p. 47–72; José Damião Rodrigues, Histórias Atlânticas. Os Açores na primeira modernidade 
(Lisboa 2012); Jean Frédéric Schaub, “Archipiélago marítimo y archipiélago político: Las 
Azores bajo los Austrias”: ibidem, p. 73–92; idem, L’île aux mariés. Les Açores entre deux 
empires (1583–1642) (Madrid 2014).
33 “Memorial de Diego de Herrera” (note 31), fs. 193–195. 
34 Ibidem, f. 193. 
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Angola. Herrera had to wait for more than half a year for the anxiously 
expected processing of the royal placet, during which time he had incurred 
in many debts – “quinientos ducados con la Hacienda real” and “ochocien-
tos con particulares” – thus desperately requesting from the Spanish sover-
eign that he “pardoned” him, at least, what he owed him as a courtesy for the 
6,000 ducats that Herrera had provided for other enterprises of the Crown 
for a period of fourteen years.35 His petitions and their answers, processed 
through the secretary Pedro Álvarez, also included the examinations for the 
royal grant of a total of twenty habits of the prestigious Order of Christ for 
the future conquerors of Angola – many of whom were the lords of Brazilian 
engenhos, like Manuel Botello. The objective of this manoeuvre is under-
standable: it aimed to equal such services to those provided by other subjects 
in the possessions of the Estado da Índia. The overcome of this inexplicable 
décalage would not be effective until early into the following century, when 
Governor João Rodrigues Contino resolved to ratify the royal decision and 
approval of six habits of the Order of Christ and thirty alvaras for pages of 
the chamber in Angola.36
Probably the most suggestive and attractive part of Diego de Herrera’s 
discourse was his proposal of collaboration with Brazil in military aspects, 
although the cost of the enterprise would fall on the kingdom of Castile, 
financially the stronger party of the dynastic union produced in 1580. The 
composition of this socorro and the amounts intended for it constitute ines-
capable proof of the intercolonial participation that has already been men-
tioned. The 800 troops that would be employed for the “refresco” and con-
quest of Angola would mainly come from Lisbon while the total of fifty 
horsemen that would accompany them – essential for the advance and 
charge of the army in mountains, rivers, and jungles – would come from 
Baía de Todos os Santos. The latter settlement would also contribute by a 
compulsory levy of “doscientos soldados mamelucos y otros perseguidos 
por la justicia aunque por culpas leves”. Diego de Herrera stressed that the 
lure of a royal pardon would make these soldiers “fueran gustosos”.37 More-
over, Baía “quedaría más sosegada”, and Angola would receive “gente 
sufrida en los trabajos y unos expertísimos flecheros y espingarderos”. The 
35 Ibidem, f. 195.
36 Ibidem, fs. 193 and 197. See also Mafalda Soares da Cunha/Nuno Gonçalo F. Mon-
teiro, “Governadores e capitães-mores do imperio atlántico portugês nos séculos XVII e 
XVIII”: Nuno Gonçalo F. Monteiro/Pedro Cardim/Mafalda Soares da Cunha (orgs.), Optima 
Pars. Elites Ibero-Americanas do Antigo Regime (Lisbon 2005), p. 191–252; and Pedro Car-
dim/Joan-Lluís Palos (eds.), El Mundo de los virreyes en las monarquías de España y Portu-
gal (Madrid/Frankfurt am Main 2012).
37 “Memorial de Diego de Herrera” (note 31), f. 197.
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total cost of the enterprise of Angola – to be paid, as already mentioned, by 
the king of Spain’s treasury – would not surpass 70,000 ducats, of which 
approximately one tenth would be set aside for an indeterminate number of 
miners who would be transported to these territories to joyfully and effi-
ciently exploit the rich metalliferous deposits of the same – basically gold, 
silver, copper, and lead. The large sum envisaged for the expansionist enter-
prise of Angola did not appear to be a problem for Herrera, who, as has 
already been mentioned, had served in Peru and knew first hand its abun-
dance of natural resources. He promised even more advantages than those 
derived from the conquests in America due to Angola’s many mines and 
slaves. Spain’s financial aid would be essential to expand even to the Mono-
motapa region, which some geographers of the time, following the Medie-
val tradition, did not doubt to liken to the mythical country of Ophir, “la 
cosa más nombrada que hubo en el mundo”.38
This kind of legends, which enjoyed certain overtones of authenticity 
well into the seventeenth century, influenced Domingo de Abreu e Brito 
when he wrote his interesting Sumario e descripçao do Reino de Angola, e 
do Descobrimento da Ilha de Loanda (1592).39 Independently of its socio-
economic value, the truth is that this text was intended as an incentive for 
the Crown to get more involved in the territorial expansion that took place 
in this area of the African continent between 1575 and 1589. We ignore 
almost everything about its author. Fortunately, though, we know that this 
miscellaneous text – labelled in some of its pages as alvitere – was the final 
result of a research mission carried out for the Spanish Crown by Abreu e 
Brito in Angola between 1590 and 1591.40 Its real purpose was completely 
unequivocal: to confirm or dismiss certain rumours about frauds committed 
in the colony during the later years of the government of Paulo Dias de 
Novais and the early years of that of his successor, Luis Serrão. In a nut-
shell, the main argument of the Sumario e descripçao was that the total lack 
of assistance – of men, armament, and domestic essentials of all sorts – that 
the Iberian fortifications in Angola suffered from lay at the core of corrup-
38 Ibidem. On these legends, Godinho, Os descobrimentos (note 16), vol. I, p. 183–209; 
Francesc Relaño, La emergencia de África como continente: un nuevo mundo a partir del 
viejo (Lérida 2000); Jean Michel Massing, “The Image of Africa and the Iconography of Lip-
plated Africans in Pierre Desceliers’s World Map of 1550”: Thomas F. Earle/K. J. P. Lowe 
(eds.), Black Africans in Renaissance Europe (Cambridge 2005), chapter 2; Marina Alfonso 
Mola/Carlos Martínez Shaw, “La Etiopía imaginaria de Luis de Urreta”: Cuadernos de His-
toria de España 85–86 (2011–2012), p. 33–50. 
39 “Sumario e descripçao do reino de Angola” (note 31).
40 Ibidem, f. 36; Cortesão, História da espansão portuguesa (note 31), p. 75; Alburquer-
que Felner, Um inquérito (note 31), p. VII.
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tion. Abreu e Brito pointed out to Philip II and his most concerned ministers 
that the military forces that had been transported to that area of Africa up to 
that date were more than insufficient to establish the “señorío del mar” 
deserved by a monarch who was likened by apologetic treatise writers of 
the period to a new Neptune handling his infallible trident. There were no 
possible alternatives for Abreu; either Philip II promptly resolved to send 
troops and victuals for Angola or else it would be better to give up the sig-
nificant territory acquired since 1575, “pues los enemigos eran muchos y 
muy competentes para la lucha”.
Curiously enough, the solution propounded by Abreu e Brito was the 
same as that declared by Diego de Herrera just a few years earlier. It was 
imperative to send to Angola a total number of 1,000 soldiers, “bien arma-
dos y munizados”, and fifty horsemen. A significant contingent as such, 
mainly coming from Lisbon and Baía de Todos os Santos, would be able to 
penetrate even into the lands of the Monomotapa. The annexation into the 
“composite monarchy” of the Spanish Habsburgs of this African supraterri-
tory comprised by the fertile Island of Luanda, Angola, and the modern 
states that form a natural corridor towards Mozambique, would provide 
grandeza and significant resources to the depleted royal treasury, and 
doubtlessly they would contribute to greatly reduce the time employed in 
marine communications between Lisbon and the East Indies almost by 
half.41
In contrast with the texts by Diego de Herrera and Domingo de Abreu e 
Brito, in which, as we have seen, they advocated for a more interventionist 
presence of the Spanish Crown in its recently acquired possessions of West-
ern Africa as well as for military collaboration between Angola and Brazil, 
thus anticipating the prevalent theme for the second half of the seventeenth 
century, the texts that Jerónimo Castaño sent to the Council of Portugal in 
Madrid are relevant because they point out without any convolution those 
who were to blame for the impasse suffered by the “conquest” of Angola.42 
It was definitely not the fault of Governor Paulo Dias de Novais, who, 
according to Castaño, distinguished himself from all of his successors in the 
post not only because he set aside the profits derived from the black slave 
trafficking for the Crown of Spain but also because he decided to do the 
41 “Sumario e descripçao do reino de Angola” (note 31), fs. 2, 5–10, 11–13, 14, and 16. 
Allusions to this “Iberian Neptune” in Pagden, Señores de todo el Mundo (note 17), p. 88, 
and in general chapters 2 and 3. See also Geoffrey Parker, “David or Goliath? Philip II and 
his world in the 1580s”: Richard L. Kagan/Geoffrey Parker (eds.), Spain, Europe and the 
Atlantic World: Essays in Honour of John H. Elliott (Cambridge 1995), p. 245–266. 
42 “Memorial de Jerónimo Castaño” (note 31), fs. 169–174, 202–205, here: fs. 169 and 
173–174. 
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same with the quantities resulting from the tribute paid by the Sobas as vas-
sals to the Catholic king. To that end, Dias de Novais could undoubtedly 
count on his cooperation and that of other prominent officials who had 
accompanied him in the Angolan enterprise. Such were the cases of Luis 
Serrão – who, as we have seen, replaced him in the government of Angola 
–, Pedro da Fonseca – who was a relative of Dias de Novais’s –, García 
Mendes Castelo Branco, Manuel João, and Jácome da Cunha – all three of 
whom were distinguished captains in the main fortifications of Angola. 
There are no doubts, however, that he profited little from the venture. By 
his own account, we know that he lost three sons, several brothers and 
nephews, and even significant amounts of money that he had paid in 
advance from his savings during the negotiations that he had initiated with 
contractors from Lisbon and Seville some years before the expedition had 
been launched.43
This understandable reproach, directed against his immediate superior 
in the chain of command because he had not been granted a privilegio after 
his services and their high personal cost to him, does not disguise, as has 
already been noted, his intention of pointing out who had been the main 
agents interested in corrupting the spirit of conquest in this part of the Afri-
can continent. Just as Castaño reminds us to do, we should go back in time 
two decades, when Paulo Dias de Novais, then an unknown Portuguese 
soldier stationed in the coasts of Congo, solicited financial and economic 
support from the regent Don Henrique for the taking of part of the lands 
that bordered on the south of the kingdom of Congo. The bordering battles 
fought at the time between the Manicongo – allied with Portugal – and the 
N’gola were a wonderful opportunity to reinforce bonds and develop an 
unprecedented territorial expansion.44 The original and audacious initiative 
undertaken by Dias de Novais would inevitable provoke strong opposition 
among the Portuguese and Spanish merchants already established in São 
Tomé. According to Jerónimo Castaño, these traders tried their utmost to 
stop the promising commerce in Angola from developing because they 
rightly judged that it would be detrimental to their economic interests in the 
short and medium terms. The struggle was of such nature that the mer-
chants in São Tomé resorted to sending emissaries to the Manicongo with 
the firm purpose of disturbing their fellow countrymen’s activities.
These problems would not be solved by time, and the Crown saw no 
remedy but to send Dr Pedro Barbosa, a prestigious jurist experienced in 
this kind of affairs, to mediate. He judged, to the surprise of the merchants 
43 Ibidem, fs. 171 and 202.
44 Ibidem, fs. 202–203.
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of the island, that it would be better for Portugal to carry on with the project 
of “conquest” of Angola planned by Dias de Novais.45 The evidence that the 
Portuguese Crown could profit from this original enterprise stood upon the 
verification of certain rumours, common during those years, about the dis-
covery of the silver mines of Cabambe, a few leagues of distance away 
from the mouth of the Cuanza River. Several silver samples extracted in the 
area were examined with the purpose of dispelling any doubts about this. 
The origins and high quality of the same were authenticated in a series of 
ad hoc meetings marked by the decisive intervention of Francisco Duarte, a 
purveyor of the royal treasury who complicated matters even more by 
advising to include Angola in the commercial orbit of São Tomé. Philip II 
of Spain had become Portugal’s new sovereign after old cardinal Henrique’s 
death and the removal of his opponents in Lisbon and the Azores, and he 
considered the affair such a thorny one that he forwarded it for a consulta to 
Don Rodrigo Vázquez, president of the Council of Castile, who corrobo-
rated Dr Pedro Barbosa’s opinions, to the surprise of the São Tomé “lobby”. 
This meant that the “conquista de Angola”, with both economic and reli-
gious opportunities for Portugal, required autonomy, and Paulo Dias de 
Novais was the better suited person to undertake this. Jerónimo Castaño, a 
moneylender and staunch supporter of Dias de Novais’s enterprise because 
he had accompanied him from the beginning, quite logically became the 
target of those with interests in São Tomé. Such was the case of Manuel 
Muñiz de Fonseca, brother to Antonio Muñiz de Fonseca, secretary of the 
chamber of the Council of Portugal, for whom the final decision had obvi-
ously been detrimental.
All these alliances, involving several merchants and royal officers with 
an interest in the same affairs and conveniently reinforced through kinship 
or friendship, were rife in the period. In many cases these alliances could 
encourage the good functioning of the whole political system through the 
efficiency that often comes with emotional bonds. On the other hand, how-
ever, other cases made clear how these bonds could be obstructive when one 
faction encountered a different one that would also logically find support in 
this consanguinity or mutual sympathy that we have already alluded to.46
45 Ibidem, fs. 203–204.
46 Remo Bodei, Ordo amoris. Conflitti terreni e felicità celeste (Bolonia 1991); idem, 
Geometria delle passioni. Paura, speranza e felicità: filosofia e uso politico (Milan 1991); 
Ullrich Langer, Perfect Friendship. Studies in Literature and Moral Philosophy from Boc-
caccio to Corneille (Geneva 1994); Wolfgand Reinhard (ed.), Power Elites and State Build-
ing (Oxford 1996); Pedro Cardim, “Amor e amizade na cultura política dos séculos XVI e 
XVII”: Lusitania Sacra 11 (1999), p. 21–57.
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A case in point is provided by the already mentioned Portuguese pro-
jector João Salgado de Araujo, who had certain influence in the Council of 
Portugal thanks to the fact that he was the nephew of its powerful secretary, 
Cristóvão Soares.47 In 1610, the probable date of his arrival in Luanda as an 
archdeacon, many of the people already established in this area of Africa 
knew that he had come to pursue the interests of his other uncle, Friar Manuel 
Baptista Soares Pereira, bishop of Angola and Congo, who opposed the provi-
sional governor Benito Banha Cardoso and a series of officers who were loyal 
to the latter, such as the oidor André Velho da Fonseca. The frequent out-
bursts of the newly elected archdeacon and his meddling in affairs that were 
not of his concern – he would even go so far as to free a prisoner who had 
been “justly” accused of murder in Luanda’s public square – would soon 
gain him the open enmity of the political and military sectors of the colony 
and, surprisingly, even that of his own family, including the already men-
tioned bishop of Angola and Congo, who accused him of interfering in 
affairs which were outside his duties. His opponents agreed to point out that 
he devoted “la mayor parte de su tiempo” to the writing of arbitrios. During 
the “poco tiempo” that he has been estimated to have remained in the coasts 
of Africa, he wrote a total of nine arbitrios, although only one of them, 
incomplete and unfortunately very damaged, has survived.48
Accusations such as those thrown against Salgado de Araujo were not 
groundless, for many men employed by the Monarchy – in the political, 
military, and religious spheres – and who served overseas wrote reports and 
arbitrios with the purpose of obtaining a reward or privilege that would 
bring them closer to the coveted access to the Court of Madrid. Other royal 
officers, by contrast, sought to benefit from the far-away distance of the 
colonies and from the priority that the European territories were always 
given in Spanish imperial policy, to become rich with malice and impunity. 
For instance in 1622, according to some intelligence from the officer 
António Diniz addressed to Philip IV, we know that the Spanish Crown was 
being prevented from receiving “grandes e útiles beneficios económicos” 
from Angola.49 The reasons for this major loophole in the king’s coffers 
were essentially two: the lack of an alfandega or customs, and the alianza 
of two brothers – Fernando Vogado Sotomaior, the king’s factor by appoint-
ment of the Governor Luis Mendes Vasconcelos, and Manuel Vogado Soto-
maior, chancellor of St Paul’s Jesuit College in Luanda. Fernando Vogado’s 
fortune was estimated at being around 15,000 or 16,000 cruzados “si no 
47 Geraldes Rodrigues, Do Reino a Angola (note 7), p. 54–65, here: p. 64. 
48 Ibidem, p. 48–65.
49 Cordeiro, Questões (note 14), p. 324.
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más”, and it had been accumulated by tampering in his books of accounts 
with the amounts paid to the ships – between thirty to forty each year, half 
of them coming from Brazil, the Canary Islands, and Seville – that would 
sail to the port of Luanda to exchange food, clothes and other everyday 
essentials for black slaves whose prices were very much below their actual 
cost.50 The heavy loaded ships which embarked in Luanda towards the Por-
tuguese Brazil would pay 3,600 reis per pieza and 7,000 reis if they were 
bound to any other part of the Castilian Indies. António Diniz declared that 
“el poder de uno y la valía del otro” had such an influence that almost all 
the ships that sailed to the waters of Angola each year to engage in this kind 
of business were irremissibly dispatched to Brazil. This way, the Crown 
“lost” more or less 4,000 reis for every pieza that was not sent to Spanish 
America. Luanda had thus become a “puerto controlado” by two people. 
Paying arrival and departure rights was not required and the prices for 
essential products were sky-high.
This kind of abuses did not disturb much the moradores of the colony 
because they could count on hordes of pombeiros (slaving agents) who 
would provide them with slaves in exchange for the minimum cost or even 
for free. An obviously astonished Diniz commented upon the fact that a 
cow or a ram could cost “tres o cuatro veces más que un negro”.51 The 
Catholic Church, represented by the Jesuit Manuel Vogado Sotomaior, had 
little to say on this respect, because it was well-known that a significant part 
of the Church serving in those latitudes thought that “[...] a conversão 
destes barbaros nao se alcançara por amor, senao depois que por armas 
forem sogeitos a vassallos del Rei”.52 Among all this disorder, meticulously 
narrated by António Diniz, there was also scope for criticising the treasur-
ers. Francisco Goçalvez, for example, who was the general paymaster for 
all the wages of “aquel reino de Angola”, had apparently made a fortune of 
2,000 to 3,000 cruzados.53 Not even the governors managed to escape 
Diniz’s rebukes. Corruption affected all the officers, “mayores o menores”. 
Some of the main omissions in which the governors of Angola incurred 
revolved around not providing the Spanish Crown the compulsory “quinta 
parte” of the profits obtained in their frequent territorial incursions and raz-
zias. What was even worse: they turned a blind eye when the moradores 
took their black slaves all the way to the Congolese port of Pinda to sell 
50 Ibidem, p. 316–318.
51 Ibidem, p. 317.
52 Quoted by Charles R. Boxer, Relações raciais no imperio colonial portugués, 1415–
1825 (Porto 1988, English original 1963), p. 27, n. 20. 
53 Cordeiro, Questões (note 14), p. 319.
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them to the Dutch, open enemies of the Monarchy and their greatest com-
petitors in commercial matters in the area.
Perhaps one of the most corrupt governors was Manuel Cerveira Pereira, 
who did not report to Philip IV the discovery of an important salt mine in 
Benguela which yielded more than 30,000 cruzados per year. It seems 
unlikely that the highest political authorities of the territories were much 
concerned by the difficult situation of the “pobres soldados” based there, for 
they outrageously deducted from their wages the price for the small quanti-
ties of “harina de guerra” provided to them for their monthly use.54
The Congolese port of Pinda, located on the mouth of the Zaire River in 
the Atlantic Ocean and thus bordering the Angolan lands, had become, 
since the late sixteenth century, a traditional and competitive centre for 
important commercial exchanges between the Portuguese and Dutch sail-
ors.55 The inexplicable lack of a permanent Iberian presence in so strategic 
a commercial centre did not escape some of the arbitristas, many of whom 
were captains in the most important Angolan fortifications.56 Their writings 
and maps were seeking to some extent for the Spanish Crown to redefine 
the territorial occupation of this crucial area, which was half way in the 
routes that united Lisbon and Seville with the Eastern coast of South Amer-
ica and the possessions of the Estado da Índia. García Mendes Castelo 
Branco, one of the seven or eight officers who had accompanied Paulo Dias 
de Novais to the aforementioned expedition to Angola of 1575, had already 
realised the importance of fortifying such port for the Crown, and to this 
end he did not hesitate to write several works in the first decades of the 
seventeenth century.57 In 1603, Castelo Branco noted, “de dos a tres naves 
holandesas” were in charge of local commerce, mainly based on slaves and 
ivory. The necessity for the Spanish Monarchy to erect a dissuasive fortifi-
cation in Pinda against the “enemigos holandeses” was “muy fuerte”, so no 
time could be wasted in asking the Manicongo, who was their ally, for a 
licencia.58 Two or three “big” ships should be sent quickly together with 
“hombres bien provistos” with gunpowder – about 200 first, for one or two 
months, then forty “de continuo” – and “mucha”, “mucha” artillery. The 
feeding of the soldiers stationed there would be entrusted to the governor of 
54 Ibidem, p. 321–323.
55 Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, Dutch and Portuguese in Western Africa. Empires, Merchants 
and the Atlantic System 1580–1674 (Leiden 2011), p. 177 (Table 17), and in general 
chapter 6. 
56 Biblioteca del Palacio de Ajuda, 51-VIII-20, f. 5: An account of 1613 on the Dutch 
threat in Mina and Pinda (includes map). 
57 Cordeiro, Questões (note 14), p. 168–211.
58 Ibidem, p. 173–178, here: p. 173.
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Angola, who would load one or two “small” ships with flour from Brazil 
for them to “comer en cuanto se hiciere la dicha fortaleza”. Such an impor-
tant fortress, which would run along “treinta leguas poco más o menos”, 
would mean two great advantages for Philip III: first, it would be useful to 
“quitar recursos” from the Dutch and “ganarlos” for himself; and second, it 
would notably increase the Catholic faith in those territories. In his opinion, 
this last point was no less urgent than the other one, since it was known that 
the people from Congo would soon convert to the “sectas que los holande-
ses les llevan y les enseñan”.59
It is precisely this very purpose of defensive cantonment based on curb-
ing Dutch commerce and expanding the Catholic faith propounded by 
Castelo Branco that we can also identify in an arbitrio – the only one still 
extant as far as we know – written by João Salgado de Araujo in 1615.60 
According to the controversial archdeacon of Luanda, the building of a for-
tress in Pinda would secure a “grande aumento de la cristiandad”, as it was 
known that some 60,000 souls in the area were “desprovidas de sacramen-
tos”. The fortress would also serve as defence and bridgehead to penetrate 
into the “fertilissimas” lands of Angoy, scattered across the two banks of 
the Zaire River. The profits that could derive from this exploration, which 
Salgado Araujo proposed in parallel to that of Angola, would be an “escra-
varia de bom serviço” and “muito marfim”.61
The long distance between the different territories which composed the 
overseas empire of the Spanish Habsburgs was a formidable obstacle for 
the royal orders approved in the different councils. In the case of the South-
eastern Asian possessions, an aid expedition and news from the Iberian 
Peninsula could take up to one year before they arrived. In the case of the 
colonies in the Western Atlantic and the East Coast of South America, it 
was a bit less than half a year. The slow course of communications and 
inevitable imponderables – such as rises in the prices of victuals and sup-
plies, the effective risks of piracy, an adverse weather, etc. – always ran 
against the fragile situation in which the inhabitants of the overseas colo-
nies found themselves. Jerónimo Castaño seems to have been aware of 
some of this when, in his already mentioned reports sent to the Court in 
Madrid, he had pointed out that during the period when the lawyers of the 
Council of Portugal were debating the feasibility of the enterprise of 
Angola, the Sobas, who had already been made subjects of the Crown by 
Governor Paulo Dias de Novais, had established friendly relations with 
59 Ibidem, p. 174 and 177.
60 Archivo Histórico Ultramarino, Angola, caja 1, documento 45.
61 Ibidem. 
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other hostile tribes of the area and not with the Portuguese settlers. This 
fact, as Castaño implied, would have a negative impact on the royal treas-
ury.62 The veteran soldier and merchant’s reprimands were, to a certain 
extent, headed in the right direction, for the apparatus of the African colo-
nial system, like that of Spanish America and the Asian possessions, could 
only be successful through the profits resulting from taxing the natives and 
from the plentiful and exotic natural resources. This specifically explains 
why so many texts following this line flourished between the late sixteenth 
and early seventeenth centuries.
In 1620, for instance, a project for the “foramento e tributaçao” of a 
total of 200 Sobas was propounded to the members of the Council of Portu-
gal in Madrid by the already mentioned Captain García Castelo Branco.63 
Like many other writers of arbitrios who were engaged in military affairs, 
his experience furnished him with the necessary authority to write about 
this and other related matters. The arbitrios written by García Branco in the 
first third of the seventeenth century are many and diverse. Apart from sug-
gesting the fortification of the Congolese port of Pinda to counteract Dutch 
ivory trade and expand the Catholic faith, as we have seen, he also alludes 
to the possibility of promoting the whole population of this area of Western 
Africa and of the development of breeding equine livestock.64 Actually, all 
these thoughts were aimed at accomplishing a double objective. First, they 
would contribute to a better preservation of the conquered territory through 
the active defence of key strongholds, which would reject any internal or 
external threats. Secondly, they would enable the Iberians to establish them-
selves even better – that was actually the main motive for the “projecto de 
foramento e tributaçao” – through an occupational strategy that would 
mean that the Sobas, in exchange for protection and according to their land 
possessions, would pay an amount to the conquerors and to the Jesuits of St 
Paul of Benguela between 100,000 and 200,000 reis per year. This text con-
tains the added value that its author does not hide his desire to keep for 
himself the position of “comisario general” of such a tax collection, even if 
he would be under the supervision of the purveyor of the royal treasury and 
the superior of the Society of Jesus. According to Castelo Branco, the 
annual profit estimated for this compulsory taxation would be of approxi-
mately 15,000,000 reis, which would be almost entirely used to pay the 
62 “Memorial de Jerónimo Castaño” (note 31), fs. 169, 173, and 203–205. 
63 Cordeiro, Questões (note 14), p. 178–185. 
64 Ibidem, p. 185–211.
WBD_412-22366_JBLA_51.indb   139 15.10.14   11:58
140 José Antonio Martínez Torres
soldiers stationed at the fortresses. Philip III, the Portuguese captain 
insisted, would spend nothing on officers.65
In 1618, two years before Castelo Branco brought forward his “projecto 
de foramento e tributaçao” for the Sobas, a similar document written by 
Baltasar Rebelo de Aragão had appeared.66 Rebelo was yet another soldier 
who, like Castelo, had wide experience in Africa, having served there at 
least since 1593. In contrast with Castelo Branco, Rebelo de Aragão had 
never been employed under the orders of Governor Paulo Dias de Novais, 
but he had served under Francisco de Almeida and João Furtado de Men-
doza respectively. Under the latter’s government, he had saved the fortress 
of Massangano from strong native pressure and in 1599 he even founded, at 
his own expense, the fortress of Muxima.67 The interest of this text lies in 
the fact that it is a different stand from that taken by Castelo Branco while 
tackling the same problem, which was the lack of assistance for the troops 
stationed in Angola. Rebelo de Aragão put forward that all Sobas, “robados 
y muy maltratados”, should pay to the conquerors a fee or stipend in 
money – he did not specify how much – and agricultural products – easy to 
pay for and highly available, more than in “nuestra España”, he claimed – 
such as millet, beans, oil, and salt. This would be of “gran provecho” to the 
royal treasury because, according to Rebelo, it could also be used to pay the 
soldiers that were stationed there.68
Governor Fernando de Sousa thought similarly to Rebelo de Aragão, 
and in a letter to Philip IV on July 8th, 1626, he stated that he had prepared 
a census of all the Angolan Sobas obedient to the Spanish Monarchy. In the 
brief annex he attached to this very same letter, he recommended to exempt 
them, for they – a total of 81 – had declared that “no consideraban que el 
tributo fuera perpetuo”.69 The political actions of this governor, doubtlessly 
relevant in many respects, can also be linked to certain attempts made under 
the government of João Furtado de Mendoza at the end of the sixteenth 
century aimed at obtaining better conditions for the Iberian settlement in 
Angola. It seems, however, that it was Fernando de Sousa who finally 
developed this good disposition by granting to the soldiers lands under the 
sesmaria system and promoting the cultivation of the soil.70 The simple fact 
that he favoured the acquisition of black slaves through peaceful means was 
an initiative that notably distanced him from his predecessors. The opening 
65 Ibidem, p. 178–182.
66 Cordeiro, Questões (note 14), vol. I, p. 220–244, here: p. 220–234.
67 Ibidem, p. 215–220, and 241–244.
68 Ibidem, p. 224, 225, and 227.
69 Biblioteca del Palacio de Ajuda, 51-IX-20, fs. 331–332.
70 Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola (note 14). 
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and keeping of a series of ferias was an integral part of the colony’s mod-
ernising project that Fernando de Sousa wished to implant. This is why, a 
year after he took the office as governor, he decided to create one for 
Ambaca. A completely trustworthy officer would try to prevent the pombei-
ros from being corrupt and paying more money than was used to for the 
piezas.
This was not to last. In a letter to Philip IV written in 1633, Gonzalo de 
Sousa, eldest son of the recently dismissed governor of Angola, stated that 
the ferias which had been founded after that of Ambaca in Dondo, Beja, and 
Lucamba had almost entirely disappeared due to disorders and numerous 
tribal wars.71 This delicate situation, according to what we know of the 
years during which Portugal struggled to maintain its independence from 
Spain between 1640 and 1668, did not get better. The instability of the 
ferias founded by Fernando de Sousa and the financial struggles of the few 
dwellers in Angola was described in detail in another letter, this time 
addressed to João IV and written by the purveyor of the royal treasury, 
Be nito Teixeira de Saldaña, in 1652.72
Whereas, as has been noted, Castelo Branco suggested for his “projecto 
de aforamento e tributaçao” for the Sobas little involvement in terms of 
costs and officers for the royal treasury, Rebelo de Aragão demanded the 
exact opposite; that is, “más oficiales” so that the authority of the Crown 
would be obeyed and respected. Quoting his own words, “los presidios de 
Angola no rendían nada [...] porque todo se lo llevaban los capitanes y los 
gobernadores”. One out of every ten slaves, Rebelo carried on, would be for 
the governors of the colony.73 The same news provided by this soldier in 
1618 can be found a few years later, in 1629, during the time of João 
Co rreia de Sousa as governor. The informant, António Bezerra Fajardo, was 
an Angolan officer close to the judgements forwarded to the Crown by 
António Diniz in 1622.74 The author of this document did not hesitate to 
point out the regrettable losses caused to the royal treasury because of the 
governors who succeeded Manuel Cerveira Pereira from 1607 onwards. In 
his opinion, and as a result of not collecting the appropriate tributes from 
the subdued Sobas, the Crown had been prevented from receiving around 
13,000 cruzados per year.75 All of these royal rights, as well as those related 
to slave trade, “no debían arrendarse” in order to stop them from falling into 
71 Archivo Histórico Ultramarino, Angola, caja 3, documento 5.
72 Archivo Histórico Ultramarino, Angola, caja 5, documento 101.
73 Cordeiro, Questões (note 14), vol. I, p. 224 and 226–227.
74 Ibidem, p. 333–340.
75 Ibidem, p. 333.
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corruption and abuse. Bezerra Fajardo could not estimate the exact amount 
because the governors had the bad habit of not “guardar ni papeles ni provi-
siones”, but it was doubtless “abundantísima”. The other way through 
which royal liquidity was lost were the “muchas guerras” launched by some 
of the governors, which were “injustas”, in his opinion, because “se mata 
mucha gente” and because “no tiene mucho sentido” since the people of 
this “nación no tienen resistencia ninguna a los blancos y les obedecen 
fácilmente”. The men of arms and the common people should not meddle in 
the “declaración de guerra” because “los capitanes y los moradores no 
quieren más sino que haya guerras para capturar piezas y valerse de ellas”.76
Naturally, the neglect of power functions and corrupt activities carried 
out by the men responsible for the government of the overseas colonies 
were not exclusive of Angola. In the island of Madeira, for example, the 
defensive expenses of which mounted up to a total of 925,000 reis in 1606, 
was also targeted by Philip III and his councillors for embezzling its tradi-
tional renting system and for avoiding to carry out the defensive construc-
tion works that had been ordered by Madrid at least two years before.77 
Moreover, thanks to the detailed intelligence forwarded to the Council of 
State on April 16th of the same year by the Castilian Captain Diego de 
Obregón, it became known how the governor, Don Juan Fogaça de Leca, 
and the purveyor of the royal treasury, Baltasar Froes, had established 
“negocios fraudulentos” with the Dutch rebels. According to Diego de 
Obregón, the Dutch sailors “metían y sacaban mercancías”, especially 
sugar, flour, and palo from Brazil, as if Madeira was a “puerto franco”. Fed 
up with the threats that he was receiving from the governor of Madeira and 
some contract-killers under the latter’s pay, Obregón decided to put an end 
to this situation by requesting licencia to leave the island towards a less cor-
rupt and more secure destination. The Council of State, which was fully 
aware of what was going on through other examinations in the same line, 
resolved to keep him in his post “por ser una persona entera y celosa del 
servicio”. The Council did contact, however, the Council of Portugal with 
the intent of sending someone “de su más absoluta confianza” with the pur-
pose of figuring out what was happening there. This entangled situation 
was finally closed by a famous visita which resulted in the immediate dis-
missal of the main culprits of such “vergonzantes actos”, the Governor Don 
Juan Fogaça de Leca and the purveyor Baltasar Froes.78
76 Ibidem, p. 334–335 and 338. 
77 AGS, Estado, legajo 2.636. 
78 Ibidem. Related documents can be found in AGS, Estado, legajo 435.
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Situations like those described above, which were certainly not uncom-
mon in the vast but scattered Iberian colonial world, may explain why a 
shadow of mistrust and suspicion haunted the Portuguese and the Castilians 
during the half century in which they obeyed the same king. Unfortunately, 
comments such as those picked up by Anthony Sherley in his essential Peso 
de todo el mundo (1622), did nothing to help, as they became common-
place. This English adventurer serving under the Spanish Habsburgs con-
sidered the Portuguese “antiguos enemigos e inciertos vasallos”, a state-
ment which was enough proof of how difficult it was for both nations to 
coexist.79 Such harsh accusations made clear that there was not even scope 
for negotiation with certain political traditions like that represented by 
Pedro de Valenzuela, who stated in his Portugal unido, y separado (1659) 
that “tan español es el portugués como el castellano”.80 It is indeed possible 
that the stigma of Judaism and a critical stand towards the predisposition of 
the Portuguese to commercial business may have weighed up heavily in 
Sherley’s judgements. Such demons were usually let loose in moments of 
uncertainty and confusion, like the proclamation of a new sovereign follow-
ing a revolt of questionable legitimacy. It was not uncommon that people 
who had been hitherto labelled as compatriotas would be henceforth treated 
as common scoundrels. Panic of a colonial rebellion was most definitely a 
reality until Portugal officially separated from Spain after the Treaty of Lis-
bon was signed in 1668.81
Some of this can be seen in the bando issued in Mexico on November 
27th, 1641, due to the Portuguese revolt that had taken place in December 
1640.82 The document, signed by Don Diego de Pacheco, viceroy of New 
Spain, declared “que todos los portugueses” living in Mexico had to register 
for “mayor seguridad suya” and hand over all of “las armas de fuego que 
tuvieren, so pena de la vida y perdimiento de bienes”. Similar preventive 
measures were also adopted in Santo Domingo in 1650 following the 
rumours – spread by some statements made to the officers of the Casa de la 
Contratación by several Spanish pilots of the area who had arrived in Seville 
after having been prisoners to the French and the Portuguese – “de la toma de 
79 Peso de todo el mundo (Madrid 2010), p. 90, including case studies done by Ángel 
Alloza, Miguel Ángel de Bunes, and José Antonio Martínez Torres. 
80 Pedro de Valenzuela, Portugal unido, y separado (Madrid 1659), p. 64.
81 Stuart B. Schwartz, “Pânico nas Índias. A ameaça portuguesa ao Império español, 
1640–1650”: idem, Da América Portuguesa ao Brasil. Estudos Históricos (Lisbon 2003); 
Mafalda Soares da Cunha, “Os insatisfeitos das honras. Os aclamadores de 1640”: Laura de 
Mello e Souza/Júnia Ferreira Furtado/María Fernanda Bicalho (orgs.), O Governo dos Povos 
(São Paulo 2009), p. 475–493. 
82 Archivo Histórico de la Nobleza de Toledo, Frías, caja 124, documento 5. 
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Santo Tomé y del castillo de Buenos Aires”.83 Apparently, any trifle could 
ignite a conflict gestated during decades of mutual hatred. This was made all 
the more dramatic among populations like those on Terceira Island, awfully 
divided in bandos, where approximately 20% of women were married to 
Spanish soldiers and had children born of these unions. In 1623, for instance, 
in a letter dated November 10th, and addressed to King Philip IV and his 
councillors of State and War by the Spanish Don Pedro Esteban Dávila, the 
maestre de campo in charge of the fortress of San Felipe on Terceira, the lat-
ter informed of an “alboroto” which had taken place between the Castilians 
and the Portuguese.84 The trigger seemed not to be of much importance. A 
Castilian soldier from the fortification went out to “henchir una cantarilla de 
agua a una fuente pública” of the city. He had probably crossed the line with 
a black slave – belonging to the Portuguese corregidor of the Azores, Pedro 
Vaz Freire – who happened to be in the same place with another black slave, 
probably her partner or friend. Even if the incident may not have been too 
significant, its final results, apparently disproportionate, seriously worried 
the Court in Madrid as they evolved into a spiral of violence between the 
Castilian military authorities and the Portuguese civil authorities. We proba-
bly need to seek the origins of these conflicts in the unsolved hostility that 
ensued the harsh repression carried out on the archipelago under royal orders 
in 1583 by the Marquis of Santa Cruz and the subsequent Castilian military 
meddling in certain aspects of the isles’ everyday and religious life. That is, 
at least, what can be inferred from a later letter written on August 2nd, 1623, 
by Pedro Esteban de Ávila, governor of the fortress of Terceira.85
Conclusion
The picture portrayed by this brief but significant sample of texts about the 
Portuguese “conquest” of Angola between the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries is a most revealing one. The repeated requests for exploratory and 
military operations which were undoubtedly connected to commerce were a 
response to diverse group interests which sought to gain support from cer-
83 AGI, Charcas, legajo 3.
84 British Library, Additional, 28.439.
85 AGS, Guerra y Marina, legajo 952. On the history of the archipelago for this period, see 
Avelino de Freitas de Meneses, Os Açores e o domínio filipino (1580–1590). A resistència 
terceirense e as implicações da conquista española (Angra do Heroísmo 1987); María Hermínia 
Morais Mesquita, As gentes de Angra no século XVII (doctoral thesis, Universidade do Minho 
2004); and Jean Frédéric Schaub, “Archipiélago marítimo y archipiélago político: Las Azores 
bajo los Austrias”: Cardim/Freire/Soares, Portugal na Monarquia Hipânica (note 32), p. 73–92. 
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tain royal institutions of the period. In face of the dangerous drift taken by 
some overseas affairs in the context of Baroque international politics, there 
was an attempt to bring to the attention of the monarch and his most trusted 
circle many aspects of the same from Angola, a neglected corner of the 
Spanish Habsburgs’ empire.86 Some of these proposals involved the reacti-
vation of the initial expansionist policies undertaken by Angola’s first gov-
ernor, Paulo Dias de Novais: the strategic fortification and evangelisation of 
neglected areas of commercial exchange, the subjection of the less unruly 
African vassals through regular and compulsory taxing – in line with what 
was already being done in Spanish America –, and even the denunciation of 
the fraud and administrative neglect. The Spanish Crown and some of its 
most prominent ministers only showed a limited interest in these affairs, 
which was unfortunate given the magnitude of the issues being raised.
It would be risky to simplify the discursive styles present in these texts, 
but the documents hereby analysed can be classified into two basic groups: 
those requesting from the Monarchy a stronger involvement in the conquest 
as its director and supervisor, and those which preferred the contrary as a 
guarantee of the autonomy agreed by Philip II in the Cortes of Tomar in 1581. 
The truth is that this perceived laissez faire in the Western African Portuguese 
possessions was a great opportunity for enrichment and social, collective, and 
individual ascent. This does not seem to have been a prerogative of the Atlan-
tic world. Something similar was gestating during the same period in the ter-
ritories composing the Estado da Índia.87 In other words, a decade before the 
end of Philip II’s reign, the incorporation of the Crown of Portugal by the 
Spanish Monarchy was already starting to be perceived as a failure by some 
of the people employed overseas in the military and mercantile sectors, who 
watched helplessly how their everyday affairs were not satisfied in the dynas-
tic policies which emanated from Madrid. To a certain extent, the only thing 
they could do was to put pressure by writing texts of a marked accusing tone.
It can be observed that for the same period a series of polemicists and 
theoreticians of power in the peninsula were re-thinking the traditional con-
stitutional position of each of the territories composing the so-called “com-
86 See especially Jonathan I. Israel, La República Holandesa y el Mundo Hispánico, 
1606–1661 (San Sebastián 1996); Filipa Ribeiro da Silva, Dutch and Portuguese in Western 
Africa: Empires, Merchants and the Atlantic System, 1580–1674 (Leiden 2011).
87 Antonio Manuel Hespanha/Catarina Madeira Santos, “Le forme di potere di un impero 
oceánico”: Renzo Zorzi (dir.), L’epopea delle scoperte (Florence 1994), p. 449–478; James C. 
Boyajian, Portuguese Trade in Asia under the Habsburgs, 1580–1640 (Baltimore 1993); Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam, L’Empire portugais d’Asie 1500–1700 (Paris 1999); Ernst van Veen, An Inquiry 
into the Portuguese Decline in Asia, 1580–1645. Decay or Defeat? (Leiden 2000); Rafael Valla-
dares, Castilla y Portugal en Asia (1580–1680). Declive imperial y adaptación (Louvain 2001). 
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posite” or “aggregative” monarchy of Spain through the ideological asso-
ciation produced by a “unique” language based on the love of a 
father-shepherd towards its flock.88 At the same time, in the overseas 
periphery, a similar operation was being developed by the soldiers and mer-
chants serving there. With the reports, arbitrios, and other pieces of infor-
mation that they sent to the institutions of Madrid, they were trying to re-
shape the disperse and badly articulated maritime empire of the Pacific, 
uniting it with that of the Atlantic, which was more profitable in financial 
terms and perhaps the least difficult to assist. These proposals would have 
meant a change in the traditional nature of the Portuguese Empire, and they 
started some decades before 1640. They were motivated by feelings of 
helplessness when it came to defending, by means of force and pen, the 
commercial monopoly in Asia which had been acquired in the fifteenth cen-
tury thanks to the bulls issued by the papal chancellery.
We should not dismiss how valuable it is for the humanities to reflect 
upon and classify empires according to the historical drift of this particular 
“civilising” period. It is convenient to remember that the intellectual 
manoeuvre against Iberian expansion was greatly bolstered by the uncritical 
dissemination of the “black legend” and Nicolas Masson de Morvilliers’s 
1783 article “Espagne” for the Encyclopédie Méthodique.89 However, 
88 John H. Elliott, Lengua e Imperio en la España de Felipe IV (Salamanca 1994); José 
María Iñurritegui Rodríguez, La Gracia y la República. El lenguaje político de la teología 
católica y el Príncipe Cristiano de Pedro de Ribadeneira (Madrid 1998); Pablo Fernández 
Albaladejo, “Common Souls, Autonomous Bodies: the Language of Unification under the 
Catholic Monarchy 1590–1630”: Jon Arrieta/John H. Elliott (eds.), “Forms of Union: the 
British and Spanish Monarchies in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries”: Revista Inter-
nacional de los Estudios Vascos 5 (2009), p. 73–81; idem, “Lecciones de Roma. Monarquía 
y patria común en el reinado de Felipe III” (unpublished manuscript; I am indebted to the 
author for providing me with a copy); Xavier Gil Pujol, “Integrar un mundo. Dinámicas de 
agregación y cohesión en la Monarquía de España”: Óscar Mazín/José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez 
(ed.), Las Indias occidentales: procesos de incorporación territorial a las monarquías ibé-
ricas, siglos XVI a XVIII (Mexico City 2013), p. 69–108; Pedro Cardim/Tamar Herzog/José 
Javier Ruiz Ibáñez/Gaetano Sabatini, Polycentric Monarchies. How did Early Modern Spain 
and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony? (Brighton 2012); Pedro Cardim, 
Portugal unido y separado. Felipe II, la unión de territorios y el debate sobre la condición 
política del Reino de Portugal (Valladolid 2014); Carlos Martínez Shaw/José Antonio Mar-
tínez Torres (dirs.), España y Portugal en el Mundo, 1581–1668 (Madrid 2014); Etienne 
Bourdeau/Antonio de Almeida Mendes/Guillaume Gaudin/Natividad Planas/Pascale Girard, 
La péninsule Ibérique et le monde, 1470–1650 (Paris 2014). 
89 Ricardo García Cárcel, La leyenda negra: historia y opinión (Madrid 1998), chapter 
2; Juan Pimentel, “The Iberian Vision: Science and Empire in the Framework of a Universal 
Monarchy, 1500–1800”: Osiris 15 (2001), p. 17–30; Brendecke, Imperio e información (note 
4), p. 479–492; María M. Portuondo, Ciencia secreta. La cosmografía española y el Nuevo 
Mundo (Madrid/Frankfurt am Main 2012), p. 17–36 and 331–338; Anthony Pagden, The 
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another piece of evidence which is useful for the analysis of the nature of 
this “dual empire” and which will help us understand its “decline” (whether 
in terms of “crisis” as pointed out by Reinhart Koselleck or in terms of 
“resilience” as proposed by physics) is the weight that the stoic tradition 
and the thought of state theoreticians such as Giovanni Botero may have 
had in Spain and Portugal.90 In opposition to Machiavelli, this thinker born 
in Bene Vagienna was much more interested in the “conservation” of power 
than in “conquest”. It is precisely for that reason that the role he ascribes in 
his works to the overseas fortresses and to the conqueror-merchants, as col-
onisers and members of the local governments, is an essential one. Angola, 
with its territorial prolongation towards Mozambique and its more or less 
regular contacts with Brazil, became a decisive territory for the Spanish 
Monarchy after the loss of the Eastern axis with the disaster of Ormuz in 
1622, brought about by the pressures of English and Dutch sailors.91
Diego de Herrera, Domingo de Abreus e Brito, Jerónimo Castaño, Anto-
nio Diniz, João Salgado Araujo, García Mendes Castelo Branco, Baltasar 
Rebelo Aragão, Fernando de Sousa, Antonio Bezerra Fajardo, and many 
other royal officers serving in the coasts of Western Africa presented them-
selves sometimes as loyal and disinterested informants moved by their love 
to their king, sometimes as badly rewarded victims who had provided 
important services, and sometimes even as reporters of fraud, disorder, and 
plots engendered at the centre of political power. Jerónimo Castaño’s story 
is a case in point. The obstruction of the conquest of Angola in 1575 
involved the king of Congo, the merchants of São Tomé, and some members 
of the Council of Portugal in Madrid who saw how the commercial mono-
poly acquired almost without opposition before the union of Portugal and 
Castile in 1580 was now faltering. By specifying these entangled alliances, 
Jerónimo Castaño provides us with a key to the interpretation, understand-
ing, and  re-thinking of this process of “collective introspection” suffered by 
Enlightenment and Why It Still Matters (London 2013); and Antonio Sánchez, La espada, la 
cruz y el Padrón. Soberanía, fe y representación cartográfica en el mundo ibérico bajo la 
Monarquía Hispánica, 1503–1598 (Seville 2013), p. 25–43 and 303–306. 
90 Gerhard Oestreich, Neostoicim and the Early Modern State (Cambridge 1982); Peer 
Schmidt “Neostoicismo y disciplinamiento social en Iberoamerica colonial (siglo XVII)”: 
Karl Kohut/Sonia V. Rose (eds.), Pensamiento europeo y cultura colonial (Madrid/Frankfurt 
am Main 1997), p. 181–204; Schmidt, La monarquía universal (note 17), p. 443–450; 
Pagden, Señores de todo el Mundo (note 17), p. 58, 63, and 140–149, and the bibliography 
there indicated. 
91 Charles R. Boxer, “The Portuguese in the East, 1500–1800”: Opera Minora, 3 vols. 
(Lisbon 2002), vol. III, p. 251–322; Van Veen, An inquiry (note 87), p. 75–81 and 147–171; 
André Murteira, A Carreira da Índia e o Corso Neerlandês, 1595–1625 (Lisbon 2012), 
p. 95–212.
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“the Monarchy” – the empire of the Spanish Habsburgs – in all its amplitude 
and through all possible angles.92
Appendix1: Rulers of Angola (1575–1630)
Paulo Dias de Novais (1575–1589)
Luis Serrão (1589–1591)
André Ferreira Pereira (1591–1592)
Francisco de Almeida (1592–1593)
Jerónimo de Almeida (1593–1594)
João Furtado de Mendoça (1594–1602)
João Rodriguez Contino (1602–1603)
Manoel Cerveira Pereira (1603–1606)
Antonio Gonçalves Pita (1606–1607)
Manoel Pereira Forjaz (1607–1611)
Benito Banha Cardoso (1611–1615)
Manoel Cerveira Pereira (1615–1617)
Luis Méndez de Vasconcelos (1617–1621)
João Correia de Sousa (1621–1623)
Pedro de Sousa Coelho (1623)
Simão Mascarenhas (1623–1624)
Fernando de Sousa (1624–1630)
92 I am currently involved in a series of research projects dealing in detail with colonial 
politics and discourse in the Iberian overseas possessions (especially in Africa and Asia) 
between 1575 and 1640. See recently: José Antonio Martínez Torres, “‘There is but one 
world’: Globalisation and connections in the overseas territories of the Spanish Habsburgs 
(1581–1640)”: Culture & History Digital Journal 1 (2014, in press), and the bibliography 
found there. 
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